{"id":1263,"date":"2025-12-20T06:47:05","date_gmt":"2025-12-20T06:47:05","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/thinkerivus.com\/?p=1263"},"modified":"2026-03-21T06:47:27","modified_gmt":"2026-03-21T06:47:27","slug":"is-peace-in-the-west-bank-and-the-gaza-strip-possible","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/thinkerivus.com\/en\/is-peace-in-the-west-bank-and-the-gaza-strip-possible\/","title":{"rendered":"Is peace in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip possible"},"content":{"rendered":"<p><br>In this essay, I will discuss the \u201cpeace\u201d mentioned in the thesis question in two parts, peacekeeping and peacebuilding. Self-evidently, to achieve peacekeeping requires us to end this ongoing con\ufb02ict or hot war. Peacebuilding, on the other hand, is an action that seeks to \u201cstrengthen and solidify peace in order to avoid a relapse into con\ufb02ict\u201d according to the United Nations[1]. Therefore, in this particular context, peacekeeping refers to bringing a halt to the current Israel\u2013Hamas war, and peacebuilding refers to preventing further con\ufb02ict in the Palestine region and hopefully normalize the situation in the Arab World.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>Firstly, the most imminent battle fought in Palestine is between Israel and Hamas controlling the Gaza strip. This dispute is due to a historical reason. The administration of Palestine is currently split between two main factions: Fatah, controlling the West Bank, and Hamas, in control of Gaza. The Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), established in 1964 with support from the Arab League, aims to establish a Palestinian state. Fatah, the largest PLO member, currently governs the West Bank. In 1988, the PLO declared Palestinian independence and formed the Palestinian Authority (PA), now recognized by 145 UN member countries[2][3]. In 1993, Israel and Palestine signed the Oslo Accords, marking mutual recognition and a framework for negotiations[4]. After Yasser Arafat&#8217;s death, Hamas, a Gaza based militant group founded in 1987 with Egyptian support, won the 2006 PA elections due to public dissatisfaction with Fatah&#8217;s leadership and corruption[5][6]. Hamas advocates armed resistance against Israel, contrasting with Fatah&#8217;s adherence to diplomacy under the Oslo Accords. Fatah publicly reneged the election and start a war with Hamas. Despite sporadic negotiations, Gaza and the West Bank remain politically divided. This disharmony within Palestinians themselves can be utilized to stop the Israeli-Gaza con\ufb02ict. Hamas has a bad reputation, because many countries consider it a terrorist group due to its tactics, including missile attacks on Israel and the use of human shields and child soldiers[7]. Compromises could be made between Israel and Fatah to make an alliance to restrain Hamas.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>Another variable, violent non-state actors like Hezbollah and Hamas, often overlapping with terrorist organizations, now pose signi\ufb01cant threats internationally by acquiring advanced weaponry such as drones and missiles. Recent incidents, like Iran&#8217;s massive drone and missile attack on Israel in April 2024, highlight their capability to impact regional con\ufb02icts[8]. These technologies are cost-e\ufb00ective and di\ufb03cult to defend against[9], thus has prolonged the Israeli-Gaza war and eroded con\ufb01dence in Israel\u2019s unbeaten myth[10]. This development could deter regional countries from initiating con\ufb02icts due to the unpreventable nature of such attacks.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>Secondly, longterm peace in Palestine can be achieved by importing stabilizing powers into the region. In order to clarify the situation, we can take a closer look in history. Historically, we can see how decision makers in the Middle East are not easily swayed for religious reasons as said in their propaganda but for more practical reasons. To analyze the incentives of nations around the Palestine problem, I have borrowed the Balance of Threat Theory. According to the theory, the alliance behavior of states is determined by the threat that they perceive from other states. In an extension to the original balance of power theory, Walt addresses four criteria to evaluate a states \u201crising threat\u201d. These include aggregate strength or power, geographic proximity, o\ufb00ensive capabilities, and o\ufb00ensive or hostile intentions[11].<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>The \ufb01rst war happened in 1948. In the late 19th century, Zionism arose among Jews, aiming for a state in Palestine. After World War I, Palestine fell under British mandate, and the 1917 Balfour Declaration supported a Jewish national home there[12]<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>This led to increased Jewish immigration, sparking tensions with Arab Muslims. In 1947, the UN proposed a partition plan giving Jews fertile coastal areas despite being a minority[13] Western countries supported the plan, while Arab states opposed it, re\ufb02ecting ongoing geopolitical divides seen today with US backing for Israel and Arab League support for Palestine. Following the establishment of Israel on May 15, 1948, the Arab League, led by Egypt, Syria, and Jordan, launched a military o\ufb00ensive the next day, fearing Israel&#8217;s Western support and the in\ufb02ux of Jewish immigrants. Despite initial Arab expectations, Israel&#8217;s population grew signi\ufb01cantly by the end of 1948 due to international Jewish support. The Arab League eventually transitioned to a defensive posture and accepted defeat in early 1949. For the time being, all Arab states united against Israel because they have a more power enemy, the entirety of western countries\u2019 stronghold just on their doorsteps. However di\ufb00erent opinions would soon rose within the allied Arab States.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>In 1956, Egypt&#8217;s decision to nationalize the Suez Canal provoked Israel, Britain, and France, who feared disruption to oil transport and were concerned about Egypt&#8217;s alignment with the Soviet Union under Gamal Abdel Nasser&#8217;s leadership[14]. Despite initial military success, the intervention turned into a political disaster. US President Eisenhower condemned the action, leading to \ufb01nancial repercussions for Britain and diplomatic pressure[15]. With threats from the Soviet Union, the crisis escalated until a UN peace proposal was accepted, allowing Nasser to maintain control of the Suez Canal and achieve his political objectives. Egypt fought Israel this time not with the intention of driving Jews out of Palestine but with Israel as a tool to increase its leverage and in\ufb02uence in the Middle East. Nasser took a lead in the anti-Israel movement in the Arab World, which gave Egypt more power.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>In June 1967, Israel launched a surprise attack against Egypt, Syria, Iraq, and Jordan over disputes involving Israeli shipping through the Suez Canal and Red Sea[16] Israel&#8217;s swift victory in the Six-Day War led to heightened tensions, culminating in the Yom Kippur War of October 1973, where Egypt and Syria sought to reclaim occupied territories[17]. This con\ufb02ict resulted in substantial casualties and paved the way for peace negotiations, eventually resulting in the Camp David Accords of 1978 and the Egypt-Israel Peace Treaty of 1979, brokered by the USA[18]. These agreements marked a pivotal shift in Palestinian politics, with Egypt normalizing relations with Israel at the expense of alienation from the Arab League[19]. Factors in\ufb02uencing Egypt&#8217;s decision included its alignment with the USA after breaking ties with the Soviet Union following Nasser&#8217;s death in 1970. As we can see, Egypt has easily shifted its political stance in favor of its national interests, easing disputes with Israel.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>On the other hand the history of Iran can provide an example of a nation that shifted away from Israel. After a Short ambivalent period, in 1953, a coup in Iran replaced its parliamentary government with Shah Pahlavi. Initially opposed to the partition of Palestine, Iran later also protested Israel&#8217;s establishment in 1948. Yet following a US and UK-supported coup, Iran under pro-western leader Pahlavi forged close ties with Israel, including signi\ufb01cant annual arms purchases and continued oil exports despite OPEC&#8217;s embargo[20]. The 1979 islamic revolution in Iran established a pro-islamic and Arabian government in Iran, therefore denying anymore cooperation with Israel.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>As we can see, the majority of con\ufb02ict that happened during last century has been overall settled with powers in the Middle East opting for either the capitalist side or the socialist side. The situation in Palestine would settle and become quiet for a few decades, before erupting again on October of 2023.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>Today\u2019s re-eruption of con\ufb02ict can be seen as a desperate attempt from Hamas and Iran. Firstly for Hamas, they felt threaten as Israeli-Arabian normalization process continues further, because their raison d\u2019\u00eatre was to \ufb01ght against the \u201cracist, aggressive, colonial and expansionist\u201d Zionist project[21]. The Abraham Accords are a series of bilateral agreements that seek to normalize Israeli relations with the Arabian World[22]. So far Israel has successfully established diplomatic relations with the UAE, Bahrain, Morocco, and is currently undergo with Saudi Arabia. The Moroccan foreign minister calls the accords an \u201cincredible momentum\u201d for peace in the Middle East[23]. In order to retake the issue of Gaza and the West Bank into the world\u2019s view, Hamas has no choice but to spike con\ufb02ict in the region. Iran, on the other hand, joined the e\ufb00ort in April 2024 by sending large barrages of drones and missiles to bomb Israel[24]. On the surface it seems logical that Iran supports Hamas, because since the early 1990s, Iran has been sponsoring the militant organization with military aid and training and \ufb01nancial aid[25]. However, given that after the Islam revolution in 1979, Iran has been one of the most nationalist nations in the Middle East; US and international sanctions has made Iran almost unbreathable. If it allows Saudi Arabia, its major opponent regarding the Sunni and Shia religious issue, to ally with Israel and the USA, Iran will be left helpless. Therefore, it must take action to stop any processes of normalization. Signs include increasing activity from Iran-backed-armed organizations, such as the Hezbollah in Lebanon and the Houthi Movement in Saudi Arabia[26].<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>The solution is to have other factors to intervene in the Middle East after the power vacuum that was created from the Soviet Union\u2019s collapse. One important player emerging in the global perspective is China. Since 1993, about half China\u2019s oil has come from the Middle East, proving the region\u2019s strategical value to China[27]. China is currently laying its \ufb01ngers in the gulf area by \ufb01rstly establishing relations with micro states in the area. Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) were invited to become members of BRICS, an intergovernmental organization that is focused on developing countries, in January 2024[28]. China and Bahrain established a comprehensive strategic partnership when the two countries\u2019 leaders met in Beijing in May 2024[29]. States like UAE and Bahrain are usually considered the most liberal and tolerant Arabian states, due to their relatively small population and realm and their role as commercial hubs[30]. For the same reason, they also form a more \u201cmoderate\u201d alliance, hiding ambivalent reactions toward Israeli-Palestine issues or Saudi-Iran issues. The USA\u2019s overbearing military demands coupled with China\u2019s large consumer market leaves them with no reason not to keep a distance with the USA and choose neutral position in the Gaza Crisis.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>Furthermore, China has endeavored to mediate the Saudi Arabia and Iran con\ufb02ict. Iran and Saudi Arabia have re-established diplomatic relations and reopen their embassies in March 2024 when they negotiated in Beijing[31]. China is now one of Iran\u2019s scarce allies after it has been sanctioned by the USA[32]. Saudi Arabia is also forming closer ties with China. China has been Saudi Arabia&#8217;s \ufb01rst trading partner for the past 5 years, ranking as the \ufb01rst destination for Saudi Arabia&#8217;s exports and imports since 2018[33]. This bilateral relationship has provided Saudi Arabia with Technology and Innovations to diversify its oil-industry-dependent economy. China\u2019s unrequited generosity in the Middle East is not only encouraging the neutrality of various Arabian nations for economic interests, but it has also provided a mediator for Middle Eastern a\ufb00airs. It is possible to form another bipolar political situation to stabilize the Israeli- Palestine problem in the future.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>Another variable is violent non-state actors. These are armed groups that threaten to use violence to achieve their goals[34], such as Hezbollah and Hamas considered by some. Sometimes the de\ufb01nition also overlaps with terrorist organizations. Normally these organizations won\u2019t pose a signi\ufb01cance on the international level, but things have changed now. More of these groups have acquired weapons like missiles and drones. In April 2024, Iran launched hundreds of drones and missiles against Israel in an unprecedented attack[36]. Similarly, Hamas and Hezbollah have launched similar attacks on Israel. The drones are too cheap, thus easy to deploy in huge numbers, that armies are struggling to develop defenses fast enough to prevent devastating drone campaigns[37]. This has prolonged the Israeli-Gaza war and has left the Israeli population depleted of their con\ufb01dence of the Israeli military. 68% of the Israeli say they are extremely or very concerned about the war going on for a long time[38]. This factor might make countries in the region think twice in starting a con\ufb02ict.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p><\/p>","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>In this essay, I will discuss the \u201cpeace\u201d mentioned in  [&hellip;]<\/p>","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":1264,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[10],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-1263","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-proceedings"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/thinkerivus.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/1263"}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/thinkerivus.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/thinkerivus.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/thinkerivus.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/thinkerivus.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=1263"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/thinkerivus.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/1263\/revisions"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/thinkerivus.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/1264"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/thinkerivus.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=1263"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/thinkerivus.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=1263"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/thinkerivus.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=1263"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}